Disappointing

Having watched every word of the Colorado 14th amendment, I have been trying to understand how to convey  my severe disappointment in Judge Wallace’s decision.  I believe I would have been much less disappointed had she simply stated she thought the actions that occurred on January 6th were just a tourist excursion.  It would have made no more semantic sense that the ruling she did put forth but it would have least set forth a logical positional proposition for why Trump is not disqualified from running for President again.

This silly idea that the oath of office of the president being different from the congressional oath of office somehow means the presidential oath grants him an immunity from having taken the same oath as those of congressional members is ridiculously absurd, but is also completely semantically incorrect.  Because “preserve, protect and defend” does not include the word “support” and the congressional one does is simply a complete linguistic non-starter.  First I cannot imagine that preserve, protect and defend somehow excludes support, but if such an exclusion were indeed meant, let’s be quite clear, that the congressional oath was to support what they had been voted to honor as representatives, or appointed by the states as senators to be supportive of, the guidelines that establishes the existence and guidelines of the position that they have been selected, either by a vote of the populace or the states who sent them to the senate as representatives of the states contractual relationship with the federal government that they entered into when signing the constitution.  

So these congressional officers swear an oath of support to the constitutional contract, and one of the principal arguments the courts began to use to counter the rights of states to annul any act that congress might impose upon them was that by signing the constitution the states entered into a binding contractual agreement that the representatives of the combined states had an authority of responsibility that obligated the states to support all legislation put forth by this combined body that did not take for itself any authorities that had not been reserved to the states by the same contract.  Therefore the oath that the congressional “officers” take is an oath of supporting the constitutional contract  means not overstepping the bounds permitted by that contract or allowing the people or the governments that have placed them into that body  to use their representation in a manner to overstep the limits the states placed upon themselves by signing the constitutional contract. 

Essentially the binding authority of the constitution was granted to it by the states that signed on to its contractually binding authority that the states authorized to the administration of the constitutional contract through the signatories of the states to the constitution.  The obligation of supporting that contract between the states and the federal government imposed duties of maintaining the contractual rights  the states granted to the federal government as listed in the constitution and to preserve the rights that the states did not grant.  In his Dobbs decision, Alito refers to John Marshall’s decision in Gibbons v. Ogden as a binding interpretation of how the court views the federal v. states issue.  I might suggest that it might well be, but Alito doesn’t appear to understand what the distinctions Marshall set forth in the decision.  It is remarkable in the way Marshall distinguishes the rights the state retains is limited by all of the rights the government grants to congress and the state has none of the rights it has given to congress.

The role of the federal legislators within the contractual limits of what the United representatives of the states both to their states, and to the government that the states  are contracting with must be supported by those representatives chosen to represent the states role within the very contract itself.  

 The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

So the contract itself requires an oath of affirmation  no only by any members that the states send to represent their interests to the federal government the states have contracted to support but by all of the officers of all of the branches of government of the states who contracted together when they signed the constitution.  Thus Article VI eliminates any state nullification of any action they may individually not favor because all of their state officials are bound by a similar oath to support the contract to which they agreed to be binding upon each state that entered into the agreement that was the Constitution.  So completely irregardless of any other interpretation of section 3  of the 14th amendment , it merely affirms that those who violate the oath that Article VI says any person representing either the federal government or any of the state governments that have entered into this contract must swear to support, and support in this instance, is an allegiance of obeisance in regards to the contractual obligations that the officers of the state are equally bound to as are the officers of the federal government.  Support, in this sense, is the oath to support this obeisance to fulfilling the contract by all representatives at any level or branch of the government of both state and federal governments who entered into the contract as a contract of mutuality that is bound and executed through those representatives of both the state and federal positions.  The oath of both to support this agreement must be equally an oath of all representatives of all branches and all levels of government for that mutual support of the agreement that they have mutually bound themselves and must swear to support that agreement.  

The only new ground presented in section 3 is the barring of anyone who has taken that oath of support and then violates that oath from being able to be a representative of that government a second time at any level, state or federal and within any branch of that government.  Period,  barring a declaration of amnesty of exemption by two-thirds of the members of the federal legislature, and no other branch or level of government is granted the right to grant this amnesty, including any grant of authority for a president to pardon any violator of that oath.

All of the authorities listed in Article VI are once again listed in section 3.  Section 3 merely bars these officials from being able to perjure themselves a second time if they had ever done so in violating that oath of support in the past.  The idea that the section only applies to the civil war era is therefore nonsensical sense it was established in the constitution itself that one must be bound to support that constitution to participate in the functioning of that government before one is permitted to participate in its functioning.  

Of course since the oath was mandated in Article VI as an a priori condition of having any functioning participation in the governmental bodies, not only of the United States, but of any state within the United States, there was never a time when violators of said oath  had not engaged in criminality should they have violated that oath and therefore they will always remain bound to support that oath.  They could be prosecuted for any violations or removed from office for any violations because participation in any functioning role in government at either state or federal levels was always contingent upon an oath to support its function, and any corrupt official, or any official who swore that oath would have been subject to being considered a criminal against that oath.  So once again, section 3 only reaffirmed Article 6 and eliminated criminal violators of that oath who had engaged, or abetted a rebellion or insurrection to be barred from further taking any oath to participate in the functioning at any level in American government in the future unless pardoned in a very particular manner by two-thirds of congress beyond any other criminality of violation of the oath that might have already existed.  It has nothing to do with any criminal consequences that could be applied for those who violated said oaths and it has nothing to do with whether anyone can be elected to serve in any functioning role in the governments of the United States because the role at which anyone functions, or the branch in which anyone participates, or the position (office) to which anyone might possibly serve are all excluded minus the procedures that are set forth before they can be permitted to once again participate in the functions in any position (office).  So does this somehow mean that because the president does not take an oath to support the constitution he is somehow exempted from its provisions,or that it ever meant that, going back to Article VI?  

Well that would then indicate that a president who had not needed to support the constitution via an Article VI oath could thereafter fill another role in the functioning of the government at some level or in some branch of government that would be a position (office) within the government that he had never sworn to support which seems actually to be the height of absurdity and therefore no one has suggested that Donald Trump could therefore run for office as a Senator or be elected as a state governor because obviously section 3 excludes him from such positions.  But if he is excluded from positions (offices) that require him to swear an oath to support the constitution that he had never had to take, how could he therefore be barred from functioning in those positions (offices)any more than he could be barred from seeking the presidency?  And yet clearly both Article VI and section 3 demand the oath of support to hold those positions (offices) and clearly his entitlement to be able to serve in those capacities have found no one saying he could be entitled to hold any position (office) other than that of presidency. And similarly only because one participates in a criminal action in violation cannot be understood that one that has not taken the Article VI oath can create any criminal action against the constitution  and therefore be entitled to function in a role within the scope of oath simply because he has never before taken an oath.  In other words, Benedict Arnold could never have been permitted to take an oath to support the constitution even though the constitution didn’t even exist when he violated the more common oath of citizenship.  Spencer Rhodes or Enrique Tarrio could not run for any role to function in support of the constitution, I shouldn’t think, even though neither  has previously taken an oath to support the constitution. So more than likely as convicted seditionists against the constitution they should be barred from even taken an oath to support their actions have already declared they do not support.  (Once again excepting an eligible pardon of their offenses.)  So simply because section 3 says those who previously perjured that oath are ineligible to once again be eligible to function in any role that must take the oath, does not mean that anyone who has never taken the oath cannot be barred from ever taking the oath if they have demonstrably been known to violate the oath that thy might be required to take were they to be selected to function in any role that would require one to take such an oath.  So should Judge Walters say Donald Trump engaged in an insurrection (as she does), how can she conclude that if the role of the president, even if it is not or never has been an officer of the United States, that that somehow means he is eligible to perform any function or role within the United States, whether it as an officer or not?

So let’s go to Article II and look at exactly what the constitution says is the role of the president, what the position (office) entails, and how the position (office) is chosen.

Let’s first skip ahead to the position, or the duties set forth in  section 2, clause 1 of Article II that enumerate his powers.  

• Clause 1 Military, Administrative, and Clemency

• The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

• Section 3 Duties

• He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Now those are essentially the constitutional duties and responsibilities of the presidency.  The first enumerated is as  the leader of the United States military as its commander-in-chief.  All officers of the military, civil and military, federal or state, are enumerated in section 3 as being effectively barred from further service.  It as the commander-in-chief that his oath to “preserve, protect and defend” the constitution must come into play via the functions of his duties enumerated in the constitution; his role as its commander in chief of the military that he swears to uphold by faithfully  preserving, protecting and defending the constitution of the United States.  Only as commander-in-chief of the military can he uphold any of those duties his oath requires of him to fulfill. Were the military independently commanded by other officers within the military then there would be no manner in which the president could fulfill his oath.  Basically during the civil war, military officers from the southern states  did not any longer accept the authority of the president’s authority as commander-in-chief and it was their transference of allegiance denying the president as their commander-in-chief that permitted them to wage war and put Lincoln into a conflictual relationship with his subordinates with his own military subordinates that made the civil war more than just a conflict between differing nations. Had no military officers mutinied against their own commander and the secessionist had had to develop all of their own military officers not only would their effort have been a political contest between nations rather than between states, but the military struggle itself would have taken on far differing consequences.  Of course all officers of the confederacy were not mutinous officers, some officers in the north took upon themselves a limited effort of prosecution of the war, that was to some extent itself a mutiny, and required Lincoln, in his role as commander of chief to find officers more loyal in suppressing the mutiny and restoring his ability to preserve protect and preserve the constitution against the subordinates that had mutinied.  Without his oath to preserve, protect and defend the constitution and his duty to do so as the commander-in-chief of both, not only the national, but all state militaries (militias), he could not have pursued the mutiny that some officers had engaged in.  And I have never heard of a commander-in-chief of any military that was not an officer of that military or any powers any military commanding officer could possibly have to preserve, protect,or defend his nation via its enemies, external or internal, without the authority of its commanding officer to enforce all regulations to support his authority as commanding officer if mutinous officers were permitted to willy nilly prevail against the authority of their own commanding officers.  This does not mean it has not happened or should not happen in the history of mankind, but what it does mean is that as commander-in-chief of any military is the responsibility that entails within any military is that commander-in-chief’s authority resides in his role as that military’s highest officer to ensure its military preserve, protect and defend the success of its government  through enforcement by its leading, or commanding, or principal officer to maintain the official authority to preserve, protect and defend itself both from enemies without but any mutinous attempts against the commanding officer’s ability to have orderly command of the military subject to his control as commander-in-chief.  The oath of the president is therefore beyond the scope of merely supporting the constitution and is directly related to his role as the leading military commanding officer whose duty is to preserve, protect and defend against any enemies, external, or internal, against the constitution; and the very first enumerated role of the position (office) of the president, is to fulfill the role of its commanding military officer and that this role directly follows the last clause (clause 8) of section 1 in article 2.  The presidential oath therefore, while it is certainly worded differently, is directly related to what the framers thought to be his prime and most important duty—to be the commanding officer of the military that would be necessary to maintain and support any other oaths to support the constitution.  And what is a military officer if not an officer, and how could anyone support the constitution without a commanding officer with military authority to preserve, protect and defend the constitutional contract?  Anyone can swear allegiance  to support anything, some today are proclaiming allegiance to support the authority of a dead Nazi, but that allegiance to support that dead Nazi is meaningless minus any means to that support (and some are attempting to develop militias or allegiances of armed citizens to be able to preserve, protect and defend their allegiance to that dead Nazi, whom they seem to be willing to swear to support for whatever reason.) So if the role of the president is even possibly not any other kind of officer it  is absolutely ridiculous he has no office and is not an officer within the United States military and all of its officially sanctioned militias with the responsibility of command of those militaries.  Thereafter, as commandant, not only of the military the president, bus as the leader of all civic and civilian officers, can command all of the other officers of the government to submit in writing what they determine to be their duties as officers in the government of the United States.  Just as it is necessary for the commander of the military to have an official responsibility of command within the military in order to be in command of the military , likewise, to be able to “command” and/or require all of the other officers of all of the other offices requires his command have an official authority of office that enables him to be able him to be able to require all of the officers be subordinate to his command.  

When I was in high school I received the role as editor of the school newspaper.  But I took no steps to require anyone to submit any articles.  I assumed because I simply said they could write the articles that they said they wished to write meant they would do so.  But outside of a vague deadline on when the paper would be published, I took no steps of authority to require anyone to write anything or to turn in their articles.  Therefore no one did and the night before we were supposed to submit the paper to the publishers there were no articles and I had to write the entire paper myself.  The staff member who had selected me to  be the editor pointed out to me that merely being editor did not make me editor if I did not assume the authority of the appointment as editor meant I had assumed the primary responsibility,  as the editor, for ensuring the compliance of those assigned to write the articles they were assigned to write.  As she told me, my role as editor was the role of the official in charge of producing the paper and that meant I was officially appointed to be in charge, or to be the prime official in charge of the production of the paper.  So while the editor of a paper or newsletter might not normally be thought of as an officer of the newspaper (or at least I didn’t think of it in that matter) my role as editor was that of being the officer in charge of ensuring the newspaper was produced. Someone who is able to require the compliance of other officers must of necessity be the officer in charge of all of the officers that are under his control.  So once again the constitution not only places the president as not only the commanding officer of all military authority, but the commanding officer above all other civic and civilian officers whose roles he commands.  So under what phraseology in the  English language is the commandant in charge of all “officers in the executive” not an officer over all of those officers in which is commander of?  If all of the other officers can be required to function under his direction under what authority does someone become enabled  to require all other officers to function as he directs if he has no official office to direct them?  This is simply linguistic malfeasance that makes an absurdity of the  duties of the president by somehow trying to pretend that merely having authority over all other officers does not make one the officer in charge of all other officers because no such awkward phraseology is necessary;  and sometimes making assumptions makes less of a fool of you and me that not making assumptions that are by their very

phraseology determinative of the assumption that is implied by that phraseology.  In other words why should it have  been necessary to write this entire long explanative paragraph into the constitution when the implication that the authority over all officers is implicit in the authority over other officers can only be had by an official in charge of other officers.

So I found myself gravely disappointed by Judge Walters somehow falling prey to these bits of logic that purport to base themselves on constitutional omissions that are not even omissions because the common interpretation supplies the context and made the direct entrance of the word “officer” of the United States completely unnecessary and could have been more complicated and required more explanation had they entered the word “officer” without any need to tell anyone that a person of authority over all officers is an officer in charge of all of the officers he is charge of.

Please, this is just silliness.